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Landmines in Libya
Landmines are an unfortunate part of Libya’s past and present. As such, the author discusses the vari-
ous types of mines that have been found so far, providing a technical overview of each. With his land-
mine analysis, King warns of the difficulties that lie ahead as deminers begin to address the problem.
by Colin King [ Fenix-Insight Ltd. ] 
Until recently, the primary threat from mines in Libya originated from the Western Desert Campaigns of the Second World War (June 1940–February 1943) 
and a series of conflicts with Chad between 1978 and 1987. 
During the recent civil war, it emerged that Libya also has 
substantial landmine stockpiles, and that both anti-personnel 
and anti-tank mines had been laid during the hostilities. In 
addition to the common Cold War legacy weapons found in 
many countries, there have been some unexpected finds, in-
cluding landmine types of which little was previously known.
What follows is a brief technical overview of the mines and 
mine threats recently found in Libya, including some of the 
questions raised by these findings.
Type 84
Perhaps the most significant recent find is the Chinese 
Type 84. For many years those working in demining knew 
about this rocket-dispensed scatterable munition (84 repre-
sents the approximate year of introduction), but there were no 
reports that the mine had ever been deployed and little tech-
nical detail was available. Suddenly, in May 2011, these mines 
were used against the port of Misrata, and for a time a number 
remained unexploded in the streets before they were cleared.
The Type 84 used in Libya differs slightly from those shown 
in Chinese sales literature, but key features remain, includ-
ing a parachute, three folding prongs (designed to stick into 
the ground on impact) and electronic magnetic influence fuze. 
Initiation using magnetic influence is particularly significant 
to deminers since these fuzes can be highly sensitive to both 
the proximity of small magnetic objects and to movement. 
It is unknown whether this Type 84 variant incorporates a 
self-destruct feature but, if so, it has clearly failed in a num-
ber of cases. As the explosive-ordnance disposal community 
has learned over the years, this is hardly a surprise; so-called 
back-up fuzes not only fail with alarming regularity, but also 
provide another potential means of accidental initiation.
TAB-1
The TAB-1 is a Brazilian AP blast mine that has already 
been responsible for a number of casualties in Libya. It was 
also used in Ecuador and Peru, but little was known of its 
make-up until it was examined recently.
Although not a true minimum-metal mine, the metal con-
tent of the TAB-1 is low, with the only metallic components 
being the mild steel firing pin (0.36 g) and the aluminum det-
onator capsule (estimated at 0.15 g). The main charge is ap-
proximately 60 g of Pentolite (PETN/TNTmixture1, 2). There 
is also a small booster pellet, which appears to be PETN, in 
the base of the fuze. The simple mechanical fuze screws into 
the central well of the mine body and is actuated by a pressure 
of approximately 20 kg. There is no safety or arming device. 
Also noteworthy is that the TAB-1 is used as the initiator for 
an AT mine (also designated TAB-1). The two tend to be sup-
plied and used together; therefore, there is a distinct possibil-
ity that the AT mine may also be present in Libya.
The Chinese Type 84 is a scatterable AT mine initiated by a 
magnetic influence fuze.
All photos courtesy of the author.
Belgian M3 and M3A1
The most common mines in Libya appear to be the Belgian 
M3 and M3A1—around 250,000 are stockpiled in Benghazi 
alone. Although a relatively simple and basic AT mine, the 
M3 is notable for its minimal metallic content (which makes 
it very difficult to detect) and powerful 6 kg charge of TNT, 
RDX3 and aluminum.
Unlike the M3, the M3A1 incorporates two auxiliary fuze 
wells for booby trapping; one in the side and one in the base. 
This capability is particularly relevant given that compatible 
anti-handling devices have also been seen in Libya. Even more 
worrying is the prospect that, without the pressure-plate as-
sembly fitted, either of these mines could be initiated by the 
weight of a person, thereby converting the AT mine into an 
oversized AP mine.
Type 72 SP 
The Chinese Type 72 SP metallic AT mine was featured 
in numerous videos from Libya, with large stocks held in 
Benghazi and probably elsewhere. The Type 72 (one of sev-
eral Chinese mines with this designation) is externally simi-
lar to the Russian TM-46, but uses a completely different fuze, 
which incorporates an effective blast-resistant mechanism. It 
also has a spring-loaded pressure plate to allow the fuze to re-
set after being subjected to overpressure.
Use of the SP suffix was previously unknown, and this is 
believed to refer to an export version for tropical use. In this 
variant, sand-colored paint had been sprayed over the ol-
ive green used on most Chinese mines; this is clearly visible 
around the internal voids and wells. There is a large auxiliary 
fuze well in the base for booby trapping, but there have been 
no sightings of the anti-handling devices used with this mine. 
The Brazilian TAB-1 is a low-metal AP mine, also used to 
initiate an AT mine of the same designation.
The Belgian M3 is a minimum-metal mine with a powerful 
charge of TNT, RDX and aluminum.
The M3A1 is a variant of the M3 which incorporates two 
auxiliary fuze wells. 
The Chinese Type 72 SP AT mine, with blast-resistant fuze 
to the left.
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Kabul City Clearance Project 
After decades of conflict in Afghanistan, the Kabul City Clearance Project is addressing the dan-
gers of mine and unexploded ordnance that pose a threat to the safety and livelihood of Kabul’s 
expanding urban population. KCCP is an 18-month collaborative project that utilizes the resources 
of Afghan Technical Consultants, a local clearance nongovernmental organization, to implement a 
mine-clearance plan in 36 impacted communities. 
by Mohammad Akbar Oriakhil [ Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan ]
Decades of conflict have left Kabul City, Afghanistan rav-aged by war and contaminated 
with landmines and unexploded ord-
nance. Despite the great achievements 
of mine-clearance operations to date, 92 
confirmed hazardous areas (which were 
recorded in a polygon survey) remain 
within Kabul’s city limits, rendering 
only approximately six square kilome-
ters (2.32 square miles) available for pas-
turing, farming and housing. More safe 
land is urgently needed by a rapidly grow-
ing urban population. Thousands of 
people have lost their lives or become dis-
abled in mine and unexploded-ordnance 
accidents in the city, and currently ap-
proximately two people every month are 
fatally or seriously injured.
The KCCP is working to clear Kabul 
City of mines based on a two-phase plan. 
Phase 1, which is underway, consists of 
44 of the confirmed hazardous areas; 
Phase 2 consists of 48 additional CHAs 
and will be implemented in early 2012. 
If the KCCP continues clearance at the 
current rate of progression, meeting or 
exceeding their target timeline, and they 
receive adequate funding for the second 
phase, they could completely remove all 
known hazards in Kabul City within an 
operating period of 18 months.
Kabul City’s History of 
Contamination
Kabul City has experienced prolonged 
and intense conflict resulting from:1
•	 The Russian invasion and its sub-
sequent regime from 1978 to 1990
•	 Mujahedin conflicts between 1991 
and 1994
•	 Northern Alliance and Taliban fight-
ing from 1995 to September 2001
•	 Aerial campaign by Coalition and 
NATO Forces commencing Octo-
ber 2001
Historical Achievement  
of Mine Action
Mine and UXO survey and clear-
ance, which was commenced in 1994 by 
several organizations including ATC, 
Organization for Mine Clearance and 
Afghanistan Rehabilitation, The HALO 
Trust, Mine Clearance Planning Agen-
cy and Mine Detection Dog Center in 
Kabul City. After some years, two more 
national and international mine-clear-
ance organizations—Demining Agency 
for Afghanistan and Danish Demining 
Group—became involved in this pro-
cess. The mentioned organizations are 
supported by the United Nations Volun-
tary Trust Fund, the Office of Weapons 
Removal and Abatement in the U.S. De-
partment of State’s Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs (PM/WRA) and other 
bilateral donors. Since then, significant 
Figure 1. Map showing the extent of landmine contamination in  
Kabul City, Afghanistan.
Map courtesy of MACCA.
Other Mines
Other mines present in Libya include 
the Belgian NR 413 stake mine and NR 
442 bounding mine, both of which are 
AP fragmentation weapons with signifi-
cant ranges.
The NR 442 is normally buried and 
uses a pressure fuze to initiate a propel-
lant charge; this fires the mine body out 
of the ground before detonation occurs 
at a height of about a meter. The mine 
contains 2,500 steel fragments that are 
lethal within 25 m but can cause injury 
or death at far greater ranges. 
The NR 413 is normally mounted on 
a steel stake and initiated by any of four 
tripwires. At a time when the tripwire 
threat in most countries has virtually 
disappeared, clearance teams in Libya 
may once again be forced to adopt la-
borious and time-consuming tripwire 
search procedures in areas where this 
mine is suspected.
The NR 109 trip flare, also present 
in Libya, is easily confused with the NR 
413. Despite the similarity of the fuze 
and body, the components of these two 
devices have different threads and are 
not interchangeable.
Two other mines, neither of which 
was previously associated with Libya, 
have also been found in Benghazi. Both 
the Yugoslav TMA-5 and the Czech PT 
Mi-Ba-III are minimum-metal AT blast 
mines that can be difficult to detect. 
These are large mines capable of immo-
bilizing main battle tanks, and would 
completely destroy any civilian vehicle. 
The PT Mi-Ba-III fuze incorpo-
rates a cocked striker, meaning that the 
mechanism is spring-loaded and there-
fore capable of functioning at any time. 
The plastic collar retaining the striker is 
vulnerable to deterioration in hot dry 
conditions, making this mine extreme-
ly dangerous to handle. This mine was 
believed to have been responsible for a 
number of casualties during the First 
Gulf War (1990–1991) and is definitely 
a blow-in-place item.
Conclusion
The mine threat in Libya could cre-
ate a significant challenge for demin-
ers, with a combination of unrecorded 
minefields, difficult detection, the 
The Belgian NR 413 fragmentation 
mine can be initiated by any of four 
tripwires.
presence of tripwires and the poten-
tial deterioration of fuze mechanisms. 
Demining nongovernmental organiza-
tions have already begun clearance op-
erations with the United Nations Mine 
Action Service Joint Mine Action Coor-
dination Team, working to coordinate 
operations. In addition to the standard 
process of survey, minefield delineation 
and clearance, a major stockpile de-
struction program will also be needed. 
Sadly, despite widespread adop-
tion of the AP Mine Ban Convention,4 
mines have once again played a role in 
modern conflict. They bring with them 
the dangerous, costly and laborious 
process of demining, along with the dis-
heartening prospect of long-term socio-
economic impact on the communities 
where they are found.
See endnotes page 83
Sectioning a live NR 413 AP mine for 
examination.
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